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Consumer prices for electricity in Germany have risen considerably in recent years. 
These price increases are partially attributable to a strong rise in the apportionment 
for the promotion of renewable electricity in accordance with the German Renewable 
Energy Sources Act (EEG). The EEG apportionment and associated VAT currently 
account for approximately one-sixth of household spending on electricity. Yet the in-
creasing generation of power from renewables leads to decreased wholesale electricity 
prices. As a result, the net burden on the consumer – given effective competition – is 
lower than the apportionment. 
According to modelling calculations performed by the German Institute for Economic 
Research (DIW), inflation-adjusted wholesale prices for electricity will only increase 
by 11% between 2010 and 2020 to 4.9 euro cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh), despite 
increasing fuel and CO2 certificate prices. In the absence of expanded deployment of 
renewable energy, a higher price increase of 20% can be expected. Although electricity 
generation from renewable sources is forecasted to more than double by 2020, the 
EEG apportionment borne by consumers will in real terms only be 3.64 euro cents 
per kWh, and thus only slightly higher than it is today. The main reason for this low 
growth is the fact that the tariffs for new installations are digressive, falling year by 
year. In addition, tariffs are diminished in real terms by price inflation. Our modelling 
calculations assume that legislators will take action against the recent overinvestment 
in the solar electricity sector. Thanks to a significant fall in the cost of photovoltaic 
(PV) systems, the reduction of PV tariffs can be placed on an accelerated timetable. 
Over the long term, the overall level of support provided under the EEG should be 
reduced. For the further deployment of renewable energy it is necessary to expand 
Germany’s power grid in addition to the availability of energy storage facilities. Steps 
must also be taken to increase competition in electricity markets. 
Consumer and producer (i.e. wholesale) prices for electricity in Germany have 
experienced divergent developments in recent years. The electricity prices paid 
by households fell between 1991 and 1998 in real terms. Since then, they have 
risen continuously (Figure 1).1 In the first half of 2010 households paid on average 
23.75 cents per kWh (nominal price, including VAT). Industrial consumers pay 
1 Due to methodological changes, Eurostat data on consumer prices from 2007 onward have limited comparability 
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considerably lower prices for electricity. Industrial 
electricity prices fell in real terms considerably until 
2000 and have been rising thereafter. Electricity 
prices in Germany are considerably higher than the 
European average, particularly for households, but 
also for industrial consumers.2
Regulatory requirements are responsible for a large 
share of the price paid by consumers for electricity 
(Figure 2). Approximately 40% of the price paid by 
households in 2010 was attributable to the electricity 
tax, VAT, concession fees, as well as charges due 
to the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) and 
the Act on Combined Heat and Power Generation 
(KWKG). In 2010, the EEG apportionment was 
2.05 euro cents per kWh, and represented 8.8% of 
the consumer price for electricity. 
The EEG apportionment was sharply increased in 
2011 to 3.53 euro cents per kWh, and now comprises 
14% of the electricity price paid by households. 
Including VAT, the apportionment currently stands 
at 4.2 euro cents per kWh, thus representing one-
sixth of the household electricity bill. The increase 
of 1.5 euro cents per kWh over the year prior in-
cludes a retroactive increase for 2010 of 0.29 euro 
cents per kWh (excluding VAT). Furthermore, in 
determining the apportionment for 2011, Germany’s 
transmission system operators (TSO) have made 
calculatory assumptions – particularly with regard 
to solar electricity trends and direct selling as a con-
sequence of the so-called green electricity privi-
lege– which tend to overestimate the shortfall in 
revenues, and, as a consequence, the apportionment 
necessary for 2011.3 
By contrast, producer prices for electricity contain 
neither the aforementioned regulatory taxes and 
fees, nor network costs and accounting charges. 
Wholesale electricity trading now takes place to 
large extent on exchanges such as the EEX in 
Leipzig (spot and forward trading). The average 
day-ahead spot market prices for electricity during 
specific hours fluctuate considerably. Short-term 
price changes are primarily attributable to varying 
demand and increasingly to variation in wind and 
photovoltaic power generation. Moreover, prices 
tend to vary considerably over time, e.g. from quar-
ter to quarter (Figure 3). Such fluctuations prima-
rily result from changes in fuel and CO2 certificate 
prices. Over the last five years the average spot 
market price for electricity has varied between 30 
2 For more on electricity price trends and costs, see Frontier Economics, 
EWI: Energiekosten in Deutschland – Entwicklungen, Ursachen und in-
ternationaler Vergleich (Project 43/09). Final Report of the Federal Mi-
nistry for Economics and Technology, August 2010.
3 50Hertz Transmission GmbH, Amprion GmbH, EnBW Transportnetze 
AG, TenneT TSO GmbH: Prognose der EEG-Umlage nach AusglMechV. 
Prognosekonzept und Berechnung der ÜNB, 15 October 2010. Leipziger 
Institut für Energetik GmbH (IE): Jahresprognose 2011 zur deutschland-
weiten Stromerzeugung aus regenerativen Kraftwerken. Prognose der 
Stromeinspeisung und der Vergütung im Rahmen des Erneuerbare-Ener-
gien-Gesetzes für 2011. Endbericht im Auftrag der Übertragungsnetzbe-
treiber (ÜNB). Leipzig, 30 September 2010. 
Figure 1
Consumer Electricity Prices in Germany, 1991–2010 
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Prices at six-month intervals. 
Selected typical consumer groups according to Eurostat data (based on new methods since 
2007): 
“Domestic Consumption Dc” (old): Annual consumption of 3500 kWh.
“Domestic Consumption DC” (new): Annual consumption of 2500 to 5000 kWh.
“Industrial Consumption Ie” (old): Annual consumption of 2000 MWh; maximum demand of 
500 kW; power usage of 4000 hrs.
“Industrial Consumption IC” (new): Annual consumption of 500 to 2,000 MWh.
Sources: Eurostat; Destatis; calculations by DIW.   DIW Berlin 2011
Over the past decade consumer prices for electricity in Germany have risen 
considerably in real terms.
Figure 2
Breakdown of Household Electricity Bill 

















Source: Federal Network Agency: Monitoringbericht 2010. Bonn, November 2010.  DIW Berlin 2011
Taxes, fees, and apportionments made up 40% of the household electrici-
ty bill in Germany in 2010. German Electricity Prices
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and 70 euro per MWh (3 to 7 euro cents per kWh). 
In 2010 the average price for electricity was 44 
euro per MWh (4.4 euro cents per kWh). Thus, the 
wholesale price for electricity in 2010 was 19% of 
the price paid by households. 
In order to estimate the future impact of promoted 
renewable energy on electricity prices, the follow-
ing interrelationships are thus significant, and were 
taken into account in our modelling calculations: 
Wholesale prices are influenced by the ex- •	
panded use of renewables. 
The EEG apportionment depends on the  •	
growthof renewables, the feed-in tariffs, 
and the wholesale prices. 
Consumer prices depend on wholesale pri- •	
ces as well as EEG apportionment. 
 
Electricity generation from 
renewables to more than double by 
2020
According to EU Directive 2009/28/EC on the 
Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable 
Sources, at least 18% of Germany’s gross final 
energy consumption must come from renewables 
by 2020.  In the EEG 2009 a binding target of at 
least 30% was set for the electricity sector. The 
energy plan adopted by the German government in 
September 2010 sets the goal of obtaining a green 
energy share in the electricity sector of at least 35% 
by 2020.4 Germany’s National Renewable Energy 
Action Plan even foresees a renewable energy share 
of 38.6% by 2020.5 Thus, the share of electricity 
generated from renewable sources will more than 
double between 2010 and 2020. 
Our modelling calculations are based on an expan-
sion of renewables in accordance with a scenario 
of the German Federal Ministry for Environmental 
Protection, under which the annual electricity gen-
eration from EEG power plants will increase to some 
217 TWh by 2020.6 If this goal is reached, the share 
of electricity generated from renewables would rep-
resent 40% of electricity consumption in 2020. 
4 BMWi, BMU: Energiekonzept, für eine umweltschonende, zuverlässige 
und bezahlbare Energieversorgung. Berlin, 28 September 2010. By 2050 
it is even foreseen that 80% of electricity will come from renewables.
5 Federal Republic of Germany: Nationaler Aktionsplan für erneuerbare 
Energie gemäß der Richtlinie 2009/28/EG zur Förderung der Nutzung 
von Energie aus erneuerbaren Quellen. Berlin, August 2010.
6 Wenzel, B., Nitsch, J.: Entwicklung der EEG-Vergütungen, EEG-Diffe-
renzkosten und der EEG-Umlage bis zum Jahr 2030 auf Basis des Leitsze-
nario 2010. Study on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Environ-
mental Protection. June 2010.
Rising Fuel Costs Drive Spot Prices
Wholesale prices for electricity are driven by several 
factors. Key price determinants include the sup-
ply of power generated from renewable sources, 
electricity demand, the generation capacity of con-
ventional power plants, and, in particular, fuel and 
CO2 prices. 
As a result of the global economic crisis in 2008–9, 
fossil fuel prices fell sharply. In 2010 fuel prices rose 
again, and remained volatile. This was particularly 
true of crude oil prices, which have a considerable 
influence over market developments for other fu-
els. 
In its most recent World Energy Outlook, the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) foresees under 
current policies an additional increase in real crude 
oil prices from around 80 USD per barrel in 2010 
to around 110 USD per barrel in 2020.7 While the 
price differential in Europe between crude oil and 
natural gas is expected to remain relatively constant, 
the IEA believes global hard coal prices will rise 
somewhat slower, as there will be no shortage of 
easily accessible coal reserves over the mid-term. 
The fuel prices that underlie our electricity price 
calculations for 2020 are for the most part based on 
IEA figures. The following megawatt-hour prices 
are expected for individual fuel types in 2020: crude 
oil: 55.30 euro, natural gas: 35.40 euro, hard coal: 
7 OECD/IEA: 2010 World Energy Outlook. Paris, November 2010, p. 69 
ff. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) arrives at similar 
conclusions, see EIA: 2010 International Energy Outlook, July 2010.
Figure 3
Quarterly Average EPEX Spot Market Prices for Electricity,  
2000–2010 
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Sources: EEX; Destatis; calculations by DIW.   DIW Berlin 2011
Over the last five years the average spot market price for electricity has varied 
between 30 and 70 euros per MWh (3 to 7 euro cents per kWh). 40
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10.10 euro, lignite: 4.20 euro. These figures presup-
pose a USD:EUR exchange rate of 1.25 to 1.
Considerable price increases are also to be expected 
in the market for CO2 emission allowances as a 
result of the continuous emission cap reduction by 
1.74% per annum. We assume a CO2 price of 25 
euro per allowance (ton of CO2) in 2020.
While energy efficiency increases in the electricity 
sector are uncertain, additional demand for elec-
tricity will be created through the expanded use of 
electric vehicles and other technologies such as heat 
pumps. We therefore assume conservatively that 
electricity demand will remain constant. 
The generation capacity of conventional power 
plants that we can expect in 2020 depends on the 
current inventory of power plants, the rate at which 
they are shut down due to ageing, as well as the 
rate at which new plants are constructed. In this 
regard, the recent decision to extend the operational 
life of Germany’s nuclear power plants by 8 to 14 
years is of considerably importance. According to 
our assumptions, the planned expansion of renew-
able energy generation will also be accompanied 
by the completion of all currently planned natural-
gas power plants as well as all currently approved 
coal-burning power plants (see Baseline Scenario 
in Table).
According to the German Environmental Ministry’s 
guideline scenario, wind energy in particular will 
be significantly expanded, reaching a production 
potential of 108 TWh in 2020. Due to the strong 
expansion in photovoltaic capacity witnessed in 
2010 (an estimated 7.5 GW of capacity was added, 
in contrast to the guideline scenario’s foreseen ad-
dition of 6.5 GW), we assume that the expansion of 
PV capacity will be 5 GW in 2011, slightly higher 
than the guideline scenario’s forecast. From 2012 
onward, 3.5 GW of photovoltaic capacity will be 
added annually. Thus, at the end of 2020 an in-
stalled capacity of 53.8 GW will be reached. It will 
therefore be possible to generate 47 TWh of solar 
electricity in 2020 (assuming 910 full load hours 
per year).
Based on these assumptions, DIW’s ESYMMETRY 
electricity market model (Box 1) simulates an aver-
age inflation-adjusted electricity price of 49.3 euro 
per megawatt-hour in 2020. This corresponds to a 
real increase of 11% over the average EEX whole-
sale price in 2010. This increase is first and foremost 
attributable to rising fuel and CO2 prices.
Renewable Energy Reduces 
Wholesale Prices
Fuel prices and the further expansion of renew-
able energy will have a strong impact on electricity 
wholesale prices. In order to quantify how these 
factors impact wholesale price, we investigate a hy-
pothetical scenario under which renewable energy is 
not expanded any further. In contrast to the baseline 
scenario, in this comparative scenario we instead 
assumed that all plans to construct fossil fuel-driven 
power plants will be realized. The net installed ca-
pacity of conventional power plants is thus 12.1 GW 
Box 1
Electricity market simulation using the 
ESYMMETRY model 
The ESYMMETRY simulation model was developed at 
the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) to 
analyze short-term adjustments in the electricity market 
in light of fluctuations in demand and power generation 
from wind and solar. The model simulates electricity-
market price developments at one-hour intervals while 
taking imperfect competition into account. Thanks 
to detailed data – particularly on the power plants of 
Germany’s four largest electricity suppliers – it is possible 
to realistically simulate power-plant operation under 
market conditions. Previously the model was used to 
analyze the electricity price effects of wind energy.1 
1 See Thure Traber, Claudia Kemfert (2011): Gone with the Wind? 
Electricity Market Prices and Incentives to Invest in Thermal Power 
Plants under Increasing Wind Energy Supply, Energy Economics, 
33, S. 249-256.
Table
Net Capacity of Conventional German Power 
Plants in 2020
In Megawatt
Baseline scenario Comparative 
scenario
Difference
Hydro 3 465 3 465  0
Nuclear  16 912 16 912  0
Lignite  14 605 17 465 2 860
Hard Coal 23 989 33 239 9 250
Gas/Oil 20 087 20 087  0
Total 79 058 91 168 12 110
Source: Calculations by DIW.  DIW Berlin 2011
Coal-fired power generation capacity is 12,110 mega-
watts higher in the fictitious scenario (which foresees 
no further growth in renewables) than in the baseline 
scenario. German Electricity Prices
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higher than in the baseline scenario (see Table). In 
this fictive case, the smaller supply of electricity 
from renewables leads to higher electricity prices in 
the year 2020. Our modelling calculations predict a 
wholesale price of 52.5 euro per megawatt-hour. In 
the baseline scenario, by contrast, our calculations 
yield a lower price of 49.3 euro. In this way, the ad-
ditional electricity generation supported by the EEG 
between 2010 and 2020 leads to a price reduction 
of 3.2 euro per megawatt-hour.8 
Only a small increase in the EEG 
apportionment by 2020…  
Besides wholesale prices, the expansion of renew-
able power plants, and the tariffs for EEG electricity 
are key determinants of the EEG apportionment 
which must be borne by consumers. The feed-in 
tariffs for new plants fall from year to year based 
on the digression rates defined in the EEG. While 
the digression rates for most supported technolo-
gies have remained predominantly the same in re-
cent years, they have been repeatedly adjusted for 
photovoltaic systems due to the unexpected sharp 
decline in PV system prices as well as the associ-
ated overheating of the market. In order to reduce 
the high uncertainty surrounding the rate at which 
capacity is added, the digression stipulated by the 
current EEG is calculated based on the capacity 
added in the previous year. Beginning in 2012, if 
the “target corridor” of 2.5 to 3.5 GW of additional 
capacity was exceeded in the previous year, the 
tariff digression is to be increased from 9% by 3 
percentage points, and by additional 3 percentage 
points for each excessive GW of added capacity, 
until an maximum digression of 21% is reached. By 
contrast, if less than 2.5 GW of capacity is added, 
the digression decreases. For the capacity expansion 
assumed in our calculations, this means a digression 
of 13% beginning in 2012 and of 9% per year in the 
following years.  
Furthermore, we assume that the amount of privi-
leged electricity consumption of power-intensive 
companies will not be increased (Box 2) and that 
there will be no major burdens from the so-called 
green electricity privilege (Box 3). 
Under these conditions, we estimate an EEG ap-
portionment in 2020 of 3.64 euro cents per kWh (at 
2010 prices), which is only slightly higher than it is 
today. Broken down into individual technologies, it 
turns out that photovoltaic will account for 1.7 euro 
8 The electricity-price reducing effects associated with lower CO2 prices 
as a result of the expansion of renewable energy have not been taken 
into consideration. Our estimates can thus be viewed as conservative. 
cents per kWh, or 47% of the apportionment (see 
Figure 4). Photovoltaic power will then contribute 
almost a quarter of the electricity generation pro-
moted by the EEG.
... While Net Burden to Consumers is 
lower than EEG Apportionment
Given sufficient competition in the end user markets 
for electricity, the reduction of wholesale prices by 
0.32 euro cents per kWh in 2020 resulting from the 
additional renewable energy supply will at least 
partially be passed through to consumers. The net 
burden to consumers is thus lower than the EEG ap-
portionment. Furthermore, the EEG may even lead 
to a discharge of electricity-intensive companies.
Political Implications
In the public debate, it is frequently argued that the 
economic burden associated with the promotion of 
renewable energy support is too high, particularly 
in light of recent increases in electricity prices. For 
this reason, some have even called for the complete 
abolishment of the EEG. Yet our model calcula-
tions show that the burden imposed on Germany’s 
economy by renewable energy support will not be 
excessive in the future. It turns out that the burden 
borne by electricity consumers will furthermore 
not increase substantially if appropriate measures 
are considered. 
It is essential that renewable electricity genera-
tion continues to be promoted under the EEG. 
Otherwise, it would not be possible to achieve 
the targets. However, tariffs should continue to be 
set digressively and adjusted in case of changing 
market conditions. For example, the reduction of 
photovoltaic tariffs should be accelerated due to the 
considerable drop in system costs that has occurred 
in recent years. Installation operators should not be 
provided with excessive tariffs. Furthermore, ef-
forts should be made to lead photovoltaic capacity 
expansion to the targeted growth rate of 2.5 to 3.5 
GW per annum.9 
In this connection, the German Environmental 
Minister and the German Solar Industry Association 
have jointly proposed an accelerated timetable for 
the reduction of PV tariffs. The proposal suggests 
9 The German Advisory Council on the Environment (SRU) considers this 
target rate to be too high and has recommended limiting annual capacity 
expansion on a “first-come, first-served” basis. The Council has refrained, 
however, from identifying the capacity expansion rate that should be 
achieved. See The German Advisory Council on the Environment (SRU): 
Wege zur 100 Prozent erneuerbaren Stromversorgung, January 2011.42
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The special equalisation scheme contained in Sections 
41 to 44 of the German Renewable Energy Sources Act 
(EEG) provides advantages to power-intensive manu-
facturing companies and rail operators at the expense 
of other electricity consumers. The redistributive effect 
resulting from this scheme has become much stronger 
in recent years; the magnitude of the effect in 2010 has 
been estimated at 1.1 billion euro.1 As a consequence of 
rising EEG differential costs, the redistributive effect re-
sulting from current rules will continue to grow stronger. 
According to preliminary estimates, the magnitude of 
the redistribution in 2011 could reach 2.1 billion euro.2 
The burden falling on non-privileged consumers (com-
panies which do not benefit from Sections 41 to 44, as 
well as households) will thus increase. Approximately 
one-sixth of power consumption is privileged under the 
EEG (apart from the special economic circumstances in 
2009). The burden of financing green power promotion 
is correspondingly higher for other consumers.  
The special equalisation scheme was devised to avert 
negative competitive effects of the EEG. Although not 
the whole additional burden directly leads to competitive 
disadvantage – crucial in this regard is whether or not 
competitors are also subject to similar policies – special 
treatment remains justified, particularly in light of the 
strong rise in the EEG apportionment in 2011. Yet it is 
against this very backdrop that the special equalisation 
scheme should be reconsidered.
The rules currently in place are not ideal. For example, 
companies with an annual power consumption of at 
least 100 GWh and electricity costs in relation to gross 
value added of 20% or more only make a contribution 
of 0.05 euro cents per kWh. When one takes the lower 
electricity prices induced by increased renewable power 
generation into account, such companies are even likely 
to profit on the whole from the EEG. The charge exemp-
tion granted to such companies is thus unnecessarily 
high. In the case of other manufacturing companies that 
receive exemption under the EEG (i.e. companies with an 
annual consumption of at least 10 GWh and electricity 
1 ISI, GWS, IZES, DIW: Einzel- und gesamtwirtschaftliche Analyse von 
Kosten- und Nutzenwirkungen des Ausbaus Erneuerbarer Energien im 
deutschen Strom- und Wärmemarkt: Kurzupdate der quantifizierten 
Kosten- und Nutzenwirkungen für 2009. Study undertaken on behalf 
of the German Environmental Ministry (BMU), May 2010.
2 BMU: Informationen zur Anwendung von § 40 ff. EEG (Besondere 
Ausgleichsregelung) für das Jahr 2011. Publication date: 15 Decem-
ber 2010.
costs equalling at least 15% of gross value added), full 
charges are levied only on 10% of electricity consump-
tion. This arrangement also applies to rail operators. For 
this group of privileged consumers, as well, the charge 
exemption is unnecessarily high. Companies falling just 
below the defined consumption threshold receive no 
exemption whatsoever and, like Germany’s households, 
bear the full EEG apportionment, including the addi-
tional costs resulting from the exemptions provided to 
power-intensive firms. 
The following guidelines should be observed when revis-
ing the special equalisation scheme:
The reduced charge of 0.05 cents per kWh should  • 
be considerably increased (for example, to 0.5 euro 
cents per kWh). 
Absolute annual power consumption is only appro- • 
priate to a limited extent as a criterion for determin-
ing charge thresholds. The threshold of 100 GWh 
should be abolished so that companies with higher 
power consumption levels are also required to pay 
full charges on a defined percentage of their power 
consumption (deductible).
Relative electricity costs are an economically sound  • 
criterion for determining the level of exemption that 
should be granted. The deductible could have a vari-
able structure that depends on relative electricity 
costs. This would avoid large exemption discrepan-
cies based on marginal differences in power con-
sumption. In the case of low relative electricity costs, 
a larger deductible is justified.
If legislators intend to make additional companies  • 
eligible for exemption, then an additional threshold, 
such as relative electricity costs of 10 to 15%, should 
be applied. These companies should be required to 
pay full charges on a higher percentage of their con-
sumption, e.g. 30 or 40%.
The broad inclusion of all rail operators in the special  • 
equalisation scheme should be reconsidered under 
competitive and environmental considerations. 
On the whole, a revision of the equalisation scheme  • 
should reduce the burden placed on all other consum-
ers, such as households. 
Box 2
Improving the EEG Special Equalisation SchemeGerman Electricity Prices
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introducing the variable portion of the digression 
rate already in mid-2011, instead of in the begin-
ning of 2012.10 According to this proposal, the tariff 
reduction would be between 0 and 15%, depending 
on the capacity expansion realized in the months of 
March to May 2011. This measure, however, would 
reduce excess support for photovoltaic only condi-
tionally and probably to a limited extent. Thus, the 
reduction would potentially be insufficient to slow 
down capacity expansion. As an alternative, legisla-
tors could non-conditionally reduce the PV tariff at 
mid-year by 12%, thereby reacting more forcefully 
to current market developments.
10 Environment Minister Röttgen: solar power support must be adjusted 
to market developments.  BMU Press Release No. 008/11. Berlin, 20 Jan. 
2011.
Moreover, circumventing the feared negative con-
sequences of the green electricity privilege can help 
to prevent a further increase in the overall EEG ap-
portionment (Box 3). Similarly, as adjustments are 
made to the EEG in 2012, care should be taken to 
ensure that the burden on consumers resulting from 
the charge exemption granted to power-intensive 
firms at least does not increase (Box 2).
For the further expansion of renewable energy it 
is also necessary to ensure sufficient power-grid 
connectivity to neighboring EU states. Likewise, 
within Germany the power grid needs to be ex-
panded and improved. In its most recent network 
study, the German Energy Agency (DENA) es-
timates that up to 3,500 kilometers of additional 
In order to promote the market integration of electricity 
from renewable resources, in accordance with Sec. 37 
of the German Renewable Energy Act (EEG), electricity 
suppliers are exempted from the EEG apportionment 
if at least 50% of the total volume of electricity they 
sell to end consumers qualifies for EEG tariffs. This so-
called “green electricity privilege” was devised first and 
foremost to promote the direct selling of electricity from 
low cost installations. This provision, however, increases 
the specific additional costs for the remaining EEG elec-
tricity. With increasing EEG apportionment, the direct 
selling of electricity (in accordance with Sec. 17 of the 
EEG) becomes increasingly attractive in combination 
with the green electricity privilege. Assuming an en-
ergy supplier has a 50% green electricity share and the 
current EEG apportionment of 3.53 euro cents applies, 
the total advantage is equal to 7 euro cents per kWh. 
The total revenue – including a market price of around 
5 euro cents per kWh – is thus 12 euro cents per kWh, a 
figure which in many cases is considerably higher than 
the EEG tariff, even when one subtracts approximately 
20% for selling costs.  
According to estimates prepared by the Leipzig Institute 
for Energy, there is already in 2011 a direct selling poten-
tial resulting from these incentives of approximately 37 
TWh, approximately a third of which (12.3 TWh) will be 
directly sold.1 This, in turn, is expected to reduce non-
privileged final consumption – which is ultimately the 
basis for the EEG apportionment – by a total of approxi-
1 Leipziger Institut für Energetik GmbH (IE): Jahresprognose 2011 zur 
deutschlandweiten Stromerzeugung aus regenerativen Kraftwerken. 
Prognose der Stromeinspeisung und der Vergütung im Rahmen des 
Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetzes für 2011. Endbericht im Auftrag der 
Übertragungsnetzbetreiber (ÜNB). Leipzig, 30 September 2010.
mately 24.6 TWh, or 6 percent. The forecasted additional 
burden from the green electricity privilege was taken 
into account as the EEG apportionment was calculated 
for 2011. 2 In coming years this burden would increase 
even further.
Due to the sharp rise in the EEG apportionment, the 
magnitude of benefit granted through the green electric-
ity privilege is considerably higher than intended. The 
magnitude of benefit has set excessively strong incen-
tives for suppliers to take advantage of the provisions for 
direct selling. At the same time, considerable volumes of 
renewable and non-renewable electricity are freed from 
charges. This, in turn, induces further increases in the 
apportionment to be paid by non-privileged electricity 
consumers. The green electricity privilege should thus be 
abolished in its current form.3 To support market integra-
tion of renewables, it would be better to institute a bonus 
or market premium model for direct selling. According to 
a recent proposal made by the German Environmental 
Ministry, the charge exemption for companies that use 
the green electricity privilege should be limited to 2 euro 
cents per kWh.4 After all, this proposal would reduce the 
burden placed on other consumers by the green electric-
ity privilege. 
2  50Hertz Transmission GmbH, Amprion GmbH, EnBW Transport-
netze AG, TenneT TSO GmbH: Prognose der EEG-Umlage nach Ausgl-
MechV. Prognosekonzept und Berechnung der ÜNB. Publication date: 
15 October 2010.
3 Georg Erdmann, Manfred Fischedick, Christian von Hirschhausen, 
Olav Hohmeyer, Eberhard Jochem, Claudia Kemfert, Felix Matthes, 
Martin Pehnt, Mario Ragwitz, Jürgen Schmid: Dringender Appell zur 
Rettung des Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetzes seitens deutscher Ener-
giewissenschaftler. DIW Press Release of 15 December 2010.
4 Environment Minister Röttgen: Solar power support must be adju-
sted to market developments. BMU Press Release No. 008/11. Berlin, 
20 Jan. 2011.
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power lines are needed in Germany, an investment 
expected to cost up to 25 billion euro.11 In the first 
network study released by DENA, it was shown 
that at least 850 kilometres of new power lines are 
required. Unfortunately, the power grid has for vari-
ous reasons not been sufficiently expanded thus far. 
Existing market structures have not delivered ad-
equate incentives for network expansion. Four large 
energy suppliers in Germany continue to possess 
nearly 75% of all conventional power plant capacity 
and also own most of the power grid. Only recently 
has the market been shaken up by new suppliers, 
particularly in the area of renewables. Furthermore, 
two providers have sold their grid assets – more or 
less willingly. Regulatory authorities have for some 
time criticized the lack of competition at various 
stages of the value chain in the electricity market.12 
Insufficient competition can hinder power grid ex-
pansion, among other negative effects. 
In addition to the expansion of Germany’s power 
grid, it will be necessary in the future to make greater 
use of energy storage facilities in order to com-
pensate for fluctuations in wind and solar power 
generation. Thus, regulatory authorities should not 
11 See German Energy Agency: Dena-Netzstudie II: Integration erneu-
erbarer Energien in die deutsche Stromversorgung im Zeitraum 2015–
2020 mit Ausblick 2025. Berlin 2010.
12  See  Bundeskartellamt:  Sektoruntersuchung  Stromerzeugung  und 
Stromgroßhandel.  Bericht  gemäß  §  32e  Abs.  3  GWB.  Bonn,  January 
2011. Federal Network Agency: Monitoringbericht 2010. Bonn, Novem-
ber 2010. See also Federal Network Agency: Bundesnetzagentur nimmt 
Stellung zur Erhöhung der EEG-Umlage. Press Release, 15 November 
2010.
only devote attention to the expansion of the power 
grid, but also to the construction of new electricity 
storage facilities. Furthermore, the EEG should be 
modified to create incentives for both, greater mar-
ket integration as well as demand-driven feeding-in 
of more flexible renewable energy such as electric-
ity from biogas.
It is also important to bolster competition in non-
regulated segments of the electricity market by 
mitigating the dominance of Germany’s four large 
energy suppliers and by ensuring sufficient market 
transparency. Moreover, the integration of electricity 
markets in Europe should be encouraged. Finally, 
in order to support competition, consumers need 
to make greater use of their right to switch energy 
supplier.
Conclusion
The consumer electricity price increases witnessed 
in Germany are in recent years partially attributable 
to a strong rise in the green electricity apportionment 
under the German Renewable Energy Act (EEG). 
In 2011, the EEG apportionment amounted to 3.53 
euro cents per kWh, including associated VAT this 
accounts for approximately one-sixth of household 
spending on electricity. 
In simulating the electricity market, we assumed 
in accordance with the German Environmental 
Ministry’s guideline scenario that electricity genera-
tion from renewable energy will more than double 
between 2010 and 2020. In our calculations we also 
took into account the rapid expansion of photo-
voltaic capacity in 2010 and 2011. According to 
our findings, the inflation-adjusted wholesale price 
for electricity will only increase by 11% between 
2010 and 2020 to 4.9 euro cents per kWh, despite 
increasing fuel and CO2 certificate prices. The EEG 
apportionment will be 3.6 euro cents per kWh in 
2020, thus only somewhat higher in real terms than 
they are today. The main reason for this stabilisa-
tion of the apportionment is the fact that the feed-in 
tariffs granted to new installations are digressive. 
Furthermore, the feed-in tariffs will be diminished 
in real terms by price inflation. 
Increasing power generation from renewable energy 
reduces wholesale electricity prices. To the contrary, 
assuming no further expansion in renewables and 
an increased coal power plant capacity, the infla-
tion-adjusted wholesale price for electricity would 
increase to 5.3 euro cents per kWh by 2020. In our 
baseline scenario that includes further deployment 
of renewables, the wholesale price is by 0.3 euro 
Figure 4
EEG Apportionment in 2010 and 2011, Forecast to 2020 
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cents per kWh lower. The net burden to consumers 
is thus lower than the EEG apportionment. 
The support granted under the EEG must be main-
tained if renewable energy development targets 
are to be fulfilled. Yet legislators must also take 
action at present to counter market overheating 
in the photovoltaic sector and to reduce windfall 
gains induced by the support system. Furthermore, 
the so-called green electricity privilege should be 
modified in order to prevent the apportionment from 
rising too high. Similarly, revision of special rules 
for power-intensive companies should not lead to an 
additional burden being placed on other electricity 
consumers.
Over the long term, the overall support level pro-
vided under the EEG should be reduced. For the 
further expansion of renewable energy it is addition-
ally necessary to expand Germany’s power grid and 
construct new energy storage facilities. Finally, steps 
must also be taken to establish more competition in 
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